Título Actuarial Neutrality and Financial Incentives for Early Retirement in the Austrian Pension System
Autores CHRISTL, MICHAEL, Kucsera D.
Publicación externa Si
Medio Danube
Alcance Article
Naturaleza Científica
Cuartil SJR 3
Impacto SJR 0.188
Web https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85065524749&doi=10.2478%2fdanb-2019-0001&partnerID=40&md5=084a1b86721de6b0fbf9bcdcdd85c23b
Fecha de publicacion 01/01/2019
Scopus Id 2-s2.0-85065524749
DOI 10.2478/danb-2019-0001
Abstract This paper takes a closer look at the existing early retirement schemes in Austria and analyses whether early retirement imposes a financial burden on the pension system (actuarial neutrality). Additionally, we compute incentive-neutral deductions for early retirement. These deductions reflect the view of the individual, who faces option of retiring earlier or working another year. Incentive neutral deductions would imply that an individual is indifferent between both. Our results highlight substantial differences between both measures. While the current deduction rate of 5.1% in the Austrian age corridor is, on average, close to actuarial neutrality, it is lower than the incentive-neutral deductions. This indicates that there are financial incentives for early retirement, which may arise due to the Austrian tax system. Additionally, we show that both actuarial and incentive neutrality differ substantially across socio-economic characteristics, such as gender, wages and (early) retirement age. © 2019 Michael Christl et al.
Palabras clave Actuarial Neutrality; Deductions; Early Retirement; Incentive Neutrality; Pension System
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