Jimenez-Losada, A. , Ordonez-Sanchez, M. , RODRIGUEZ GOMEZ, JUAN CARLOS
No
Discret Appl. Math.
Article
Científica
15/03/2025
001453807200001
This article deals with the study of a simplicial complex and its properties as restrictive information in the context of a cooperative game. By analyzing the maximal partitions of the coalitions formed in the game, a connection between simplices and coalitions is established. This provides a clear understanding of the structure of coalitions and how they are formed. The main contribution of this paper concerns an axiomatization of a value for simplicial complexes given a game, and an application. The results obtained promise to broaden our understanding of coalition dynamics and optimal strategies in cooperative interaction situations. A new value for games restricted by a simplicial complex is proposed and also an axiomatization of this value is given. The application of the value is shown by an example where we propose a strategy to share the costs of vertiport-owning firms via a cooperative game and the simplicial complexes formed by the action areas of the vertiports. (c) 2024 Elsevier B.V. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
Shapley value; Cooperative games; Simplicial complex; Vertiports problems