Guillen, Pablo , Fatas, Enrique , BRAÑAS GARZA, PABLO ERNESTO

Si

J. Econ. Psychol.

Article

Científica

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✓

1.437

https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-78449268591&doi=10.1016%2fj.joep.2010.07.002&partnerID=40&md5=b287a520e3a36127cf8d4c58f454757a

01/12/2010

000285489500005

2-s2.0-78449268591

10.1016/j.joep.2010.07.002

This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are Informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart and by 50% after the surprise restart In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment (C) 2010 Elsevier BV All rights reserved

Social dilemmas; Conditional cooperation

• PABLO ERNESTO BRAÑAS GARZA