Maestre, Jose M. , VELARDE RUEDA, PABLO ANIBAL, Ishii, Hideaki , Negenborn, Rudy R.

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Control Eng. Practice

Article

Científica

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4.057

1.32

https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85109064378&doi=10.1016%2fj.conengprac.2021.104879&partnerID=40&md5=a9eeb792aaa20175e679e25aced4aa03

01/09/2021

000677623100001

2-s2.0-85109064378

10.1016/j.conengprac.2021.104879

In this paper, we present an analysis of the vulnerability of a distributed model predictive control (DMPC) scheme in the context of cyber-security. We consider different types of the so-called insider attacks. In particular, we consider the situation where one of the local controllers sends false information to others to manipulate costs for its own advantage. Then, we propose a popular scenario-based mechanism to protect or, at least, relieve the consequences of the attack in a typical DMPC negotiation process. The theoretical and algorithmic properties of this defense mechanism are also analyzed. A real case study based on a four tank plant is provided to illustrate both the consequences of the attacks and the defense mechanisms.

Model predictive control; Distributed control; Multi-agent network; Cyber-security

• PABLO ANIBAL VELARDE RUEDA