| Título |
Vulnerabilities in Lagrange-based distributed model predictive control |
| Autores |
VELARDE RUEDA, PABLO ANIBAL, Maestre, Jose M. , Ishii, Hideaki , Negenborn, Rudy R. |
| Publicación externa |
Si |
| Medio |
OPTIMAL CONTROL APPLICATIONS & METHODS |
| Alcance |
Article |
| Naturaleza |
Científica |
| Cuartil JCR |
2 |
| Cuartil SJR |
2 |
| Impacto JCR |
1.452 |
| Fecha de publicacion |
01/03/2018 |
| ISI |
000427136800013 |
| DOI |
10.1002/oca.2368 |
| Abstract |
In this paper, we present an analysis of the vulnerability of a distributed model predictive control scheme. A distributed system can be easily attacked by a malicious agent that modifies the reliable information exchange. We consider different types of so-called insider attacks. In particular, we analyze a controller that is part of the control architecture that sends false information to others to manipulate costs for its own advantage. We propose a mechanism to protect or, at least, relieve the consequences of the attack in a typical distributed model predictive control negotiation procedure. More specifically, a consensus approach that dismisses the extreme control actions is presented as a way to protect the distributed system from potential threats. Two applications are considered as case studies, ie, an academic example involving the control of a distributed system with a single coupled input and a distributed local electricity grid of households. The results are presented via simulations to illustrate both the consequences of the attacks and the defense mechanisms. |
| Palabras clave |
optimal control applications; predictive control; robust control |
| Miembros de la Universidad Loyola |
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