Title Management control in inter-organizational relationships: The case of franchises
External publication No
Means Innovar
Scope Article
Nature Científica
JCR Quartile 4
SJR Quartile 4
SJR Impact 0.12600
Area International
Web https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84942079995&doi=10.15446%2finnovar.v25n58.52357&partnerID=40&md5=4bb07d3a0be57190239c7a4a881d6d92
Publication date 01/01/2015
Scopus Id 2-s2.0-84942079995
DOI 10.15446/innovar.v25n58.52357
Abstract There is great interest in the role of management control on theoretical and practical developments within the field of Inter-organizational Relations. This research aims to contribute at verifying how relationships between firms affect the management control tools used, as illustrated in a specific case: the relationship between the franchisor and its franchisees, which has not received much attention to date. As indicated by previous research, case studies can be helpful to determine the factors affecting the type of management control tools that should be established to manage inter-firm relationships. Results have found that the franchisor uses quantitative control mechanisms in order to avoid common types of opportunistic franchise behavior related to royalty payments and other financial requirements, as well as qualitative tools to assure the fulfilment of agreement-related conditions regarding knowhow, to resolve unexpected non-economic problems and to encourage personal relationship and trust. This study also provides an outline on franchisor-franchisee relationships in the model proposed by Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000). To test this model, the franchisor’s perspective (outsourcer) has been taken into account as performed when building the model. Findings indicate that this relationship shows many similarities to the pattern based on bureaucracy and a few similarities to patterns based on trust. © 2015, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. All rights reserved.
Keywords Business success; Franchising; Inter-organizational relationships; Management control; Transaction costs; Trust
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