| Title |
Scenario-based defense mechanism against vulnerabilities in Lagrange-based DMPC |
| Authors |
Maestre, Jose M. , VELARDE RUEDA, PABLO ANIBAL, Ishii, Hideaki , Negenborn, Rudy R. |
| External publication |
Si |
| Means |
CONTROL ENGINEERING PRACTICE |
| Scope |
Article |
| Nature |
Científica |
| JCR Quartile |
2 |
| SJR Quartile |
1 |
| JCR Impact |
4.057 |
| SJR Impact |
1.32 |
| Publication date |
01/09/2021 |
| ISI |
000677623100001 |
| DOI |
10.1016/j.conengprac.2021.104879 |
| Abstract |
In this paper, we present an analysis of the vulnerability of a distributed model predictive control (DMPC) scheme in the context of cyber-security. We consider different types of the so-called insider attacks. In particular, we consider the situation where one of the local controllers sends false information to others to manipulate costs for its own advantage. Then, we propose a popular scenario-based mechanism to protect or, at least, relieve the consequences of the attack in a typical DMPC negotiation process. The theoretical and algorithmic properties of this defense mechanism are also analyzed. A real case study based on a four tank plant is provided to illustrate both the consequences of the attacks and the defense mechanisms. |
| Keywords |
Model predictive control; Distributed control; Multi-agent network; Cyber-security |
| Universidad Loyola members |
|
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