Título Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
Autores BRAÑAS GARZA, PABLO ERNESTO, Espin, Antonio M. , Exadaktylos, Filippos , Herrmann, Benedikt
Publicación externa Si
Medio Sci Rep
Alcance Article
Naturaleza Científica
Cuartil JCR 1
Cuartil SJR 1
Impacto JCR 5.57800
Impacto SJR 2.16300
Fecha de publicacion 12/08/2014
ISI 000340674000003
DOI 10.1038/srep06025
Abstract In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.
Miembros de la Universidad Loyola

Change your preferences Gestionar cookies