Título Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation
Autores Guillen, Pablo , Fatas, Enrique , BRAÑAS GARZA, PABLO ERNESTO
Publicación externa Si
Medio J. Econ. Psychol.
Alcance Article
Naturaleza Científica
Cuartil JCR 2
Cuartil SJR 1
Impacto SJR 1.43700
Fecha de publicacion 01/12/2010
ISI 000285489500005
DOI 10.1016/j.joep.2010.07.002
Abstract This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are Informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart and by 50% after the surprise restart In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment (C) 2010 Elsevier BV All rights reserved
Palabras clave Social dilemmas; Conditional cooperation
Miembros de la Universidad Loyola

Change your preferences Gestionar cookies