| Título | Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation |
|---|---|
| Autores | Guillen, Pablo , Fatas, Enrique , BRAÑAS GARZA, PABLO ERNESTO |
| Publicación externa | Si |
| Medio | J. Econ. Psychol. |
| Alcance | Article |
| Naturaleza | Científica |
| Cuartil JCR | 2 |
| Cuartil SJR | 1 |
| Impacto SJR | 1.437 |
| Web | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-78449268591&doi=10.1016%2fj.joep.2010.07.002&partnerID=40&md5=b287a520e3a36127cf8d4c58f454757a |
| Fecha de publicacion | 01/12/2010 |
| ISI | 000285489500005 |
| Scopus Id | 2-s2.0-78449268591 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2010.07.002 |
| Abstract | This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are Informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart and by 50% after the surprise restart In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment (C) 2010 Elsevier BV All rights reserved |
| Palabras clave | Social dilemmas; Conditional cooperation |
| Miembros de la Universidad Loyola |