Título The Big Carrot: High-stakes Incentives Revisited
Autores BRAÑAS GARZA, PABLO ERNESTO, Garcia-Munoz, Teresa , Neuman, Shoshana
Publicación externa Si
Medio J. Behav. Decis. Mak.
Alcance Article
Naturaleza Científica
Cuartil JCR 1
Cuartil SJR 1
Impacto SJR 0.91000
Fecha de publicacion 01/07/2010
ISI 000280020500004
DOI 10.1002/bdm.657
Abstract Using an international dataset of about 35 000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations). Copyright (C) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Palabras clave carrot/stick; high-stakes incentives; rewards; punishment; economics of religion
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