Título Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence
Autores Benito-Ostolaza, Juan M. , BRAÑAS GARZA, PABLO ERNESTO, Hernandez, Penelope , Sanchis-Llopis, Juan A.
Publicación externa Si
Medio J. Behave. Exp. Econ.
Alcance Article
Naturaleza Científica
Cuartil JCR 4
Cuartil SJR 2
Impacto SJR 0.41900
Fecha de publicacion 01/08/2015
ISI 000361189300017
DOI 10.1016/j.socec.2015.05.007
Abstract In this paper we experimentally test Schelling\'s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling\'s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants\' movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schein ng model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies notably decreases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Palabras clave Subgame perfect equilibrium; Segregation; Experimental games
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